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Suppliers' Associations in the Japanese Automobile Industry:
Collective Action for Technology Diffusion
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the structure and functions of suppliers' associations (kyoryokukai) in the
automobile industry in Japan. The bilateral assembler-supplier relationship has received much
attention recently as a source of Japanese industrial competitiveness. However, this paper
argues that the hitherto neglected area of inter-supplier coordination in technology diffusion is
at least as important as the bilateral assembler-supplier relationship in accounting for the overall
performance of the Japanese automotive industry. On the basis of company visits and a large-
scale survey of first-tier suppliers conducted by the author, the paper analyzes the reasons why
suppliers' associations were established, why they continue to exist today, and their effects on
economic performance.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: L14, L22, L23, L62, N65, 032
Introduction
The Japanese economy is often described as a 'network economy', with some
distinctions made between enterprise groups and networks (Imai 1994), or between inter-
market and vertical keiretsu (Gerlach 1992). A decade ago, when Italian industrial districts
were rediscovered as a source of innovation and local economic regeneration (Piore and Sabel
1984), scholars looked for equivalents in Japan and found that the same principles underlying
flexible specialisation operated in large decentralised multinational firms (Sabel 1989) as in a
machine tooling district of Sakaki (Friedman 1988) (which incidentally is just one of the 549
industrial districts in Japan) (SMEA 1989, p. 117).
The suppliers' association (known generically as kyoryokukai ), the focus of this
paper, is a highly relevant type of network in this context. In particular, such associations exist
at all eleven Japanese vehicle manufacturers except Honda. In addition, over 300 primary parts
suppliers, many of which are members of vehicle manufacturers' associations, have their own
associations of suppliers (Dodwell 1986, as cited in Smitka 1991). The suppliers' association
therefore is an institution with a significant and long-standing presence in the Japanese
automotive industry.
Despite this, suppliers' associations, their origins and their raison d'etre, have been
relatively understudied in recent years because the main paradigm for analyzing the leading
sector of the Japanese economy does not allow for a network-like analysis. Traditionally, the
suppliers' association featured in scholarly inquiries among Japanese Marxist economists as a
tangible institution for large firms (monopoly capital) to exercise unilateral control over their
smaller subcontracting firms. More recently, however, the Marxist paradigm has been
superseded by mainstream economic theory which conceives transactions as decomposable into
bilateral contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986, Williamson 1985). In this framework, Japanese
car industry has a competitive edge because the assembler has forged a long-term and recurrent
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relationship with each of its core suppliers. The stability of the assembler-supplier relationship
enables the supplier to contribute to design and development, to make investments and to
accumulate know-how which may be useful only to that relationship. Such 'relationship-
specific skills' (Asanuma 1989) are a major source of superior performance. This analysis of
the bilateral relationship has tended to underestimate the significance of horizontal coordination
among suppliers. Inter-supplier rivalry is certainly promoted by some Japanese assemblers'
practice of making public the ranking of their core suppliers according to performance (see
Wada 1991, p.9 for Toyota). Relative ranking creates an incentive to engage in continuous
improvement (Aoki 1988). But this technique in managing the supply chain can be
implemented without a suppliers' association.
The above paradigm may, in part, account for a view that the suppliers' association is a
redundant institution whose existence has far surpassed its utility. Until the 1970s, most
assemblers were engaged in disseminating technical and organisational practices such as total
quality control (TQC), value analysis or engineering (VA.VE), and Just-in-Time (JIT). The
suppliers' association was a convenient forum to exploit economies of scale in providing
technical assistance, while minimizing the spill-over of benefits from such assistance to
competing assemblers. There were, therefore, significant 'association-specific rents' as well as
bilateral relationship-specific rents. However, with slower and less assured growth in the
1970s and 1980s, more suppliers started to diversify their risk by trading with several
assemblers in the late 1970s and 1980s, so that benefits from association activities could no
longer be made exclusive to one assembler. Moreover, assemblers began to undertake less
top-down technical assistance as more technologically capable suppliers emerged over time.
According to this view, suppliers' associations continue to exist out of inertia, and do not
contribute much to the overall efficiency of the Japanese automobile industry today.
Associations are more like social clubs with little economic consequences, because companies'
real business lies in bilateral transactions, unrelated to the suppliers' association activities.
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A view which goes beyond asserting the declining utility of suppliers' associations is
based on the Adam Smithian notion of businessmen's conspiracy against the public interest.
This was most recently expressed during the US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)
discussions. Here, suppliers' association was cited, along with horizontal enterprise groups,
as a case of keiretsu, a group of firms like a cartel which exists to protect its monopoly profit
by excluding outsiders. According to this view, the suppliers' association constitutes an unfair
trading barrier which ought to be dismantled Such criticism led Nissan, in 1991, to merge its
two associations (Takarakai and Hoshokai) into one (Nisshokai), to which non-Japanese
suppliers are increasingly admitted. Also, most of the Japanese assemblers have endeavoured
to make the criteria for becoming association members more explicit and transparent than in the
past. But the Japanese government's response, and its official line spelt out in recent Economic
White Papers (EPA 1990, p. 196ff; EPA 1992, p.276ff), have been in terms of the bilateral
relationship paradigm only. They have thus far failed to investigate whether the suppliers'
association itself has any significant economic impact or not.
From the above, it is clear that a study of suppliers' associations is needed in order to
clarify how they function and what their effects are. This is in anticipation of an increased
interest in suppliers' associations from the following angles. First, keiretsu critics would wish
to know: are the associations indeed exclusionary with strict boundaries, and ought to be
dismantled? Second, as more non-Japanese firms are admitted into suppliers' association in
Japan, potential overseas suppliers would need to have a good understanding of what
association membership entails.l Third, is the suppliers' association a method of managing
suppliers which would work only in Japan (as Womack et al (1990) seem to imply)?
Alternatively, is it an organisational form worthy of emulation by Japanese and non-Japanese
assemblers located in North America 2 or Europe? 3 Or is it a historical anachronism which
would eventually wither away with the globalisation of the car industry?
3
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In contrast to the three prevailing views in the literature spelt out above, it is shown in
this paper (a) that suppliers value mutual learning from other suppliers just as much as learning
from their assembler-customer; (b) that the majority of first-tier suppliers do not consider
suppliers' associations to be of less use now than in the past; and (c) that association members
have lower pre-tax profitability than non-members, a piece of evidence which undermines the
view of the association as a cartel-like entity. The empirical analysis will be based on data
collected by the author through (i) company visits and interviews of purchasing departments
and suppliers' association offices of all Japanese assemblers in 1992 and 1993, and (ii) a large-
scale survey of first-tier parts suppliers conducted by the author in July 1993.
This paper is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the
membership structure, growth and turnover. This is followed by a brief account of the
historical development in Section 2. Section 3 examines the contemporary functions of the
suppliers' association and their effects.
1. Suppliers' association as a Japanese Business Network
An Overview of Association Membership
Considerable variations exist from association to association in its characteristics.
First, as shown in Table 1, the number of member suppliers per assembler varied from as few
as 97 at Suzuki to 362 at Mitsubishi Motors. But relative to assemblers' production levels,
Toyota has a concentrated membership (17,839 vehicles produced per annum per member
supplier) while smaller assemblers have dispersed membership (only 379 vehicles per member
supplier in the case of Hino). A relatively large assembler, Mitsubishi Motors, also has a
dispersed membership, with 3883 vehicles produced per member supplier.
* INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *
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Perhaps the most significant reason for the varying degree of concentration or
dispersion of membership lies in the location of assemblers' plants. At one extreme, Toyota
had, until very recently, located all of its plants in and around Toyota City, where a majority of
its suppliers are also located. Toyota plants in the same locality have shared their supplier
base. At the other extreme, Mitsubishi Motors have plants which are geographically dispersed,
in Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto and Mizushima. Each developed its own local supplier network.
Even after the four plants were incorporated into the newly independent Mitsubishi Motor
Corporation in 1970, the scope for consolidating the supplier base was limited. This limitation
was aggravated by Mitsubishi's wide product variety, ranging from large trucks and buses to
small passenger cars.
Membership is Encompassing to a Varying Degree
Automotive suppliers may be broadly classified into three categories: parts suppliers,
raw materials suppliers, and suppliers of equipment and tools. Most assemblers have an
association exclusively for parts suppliers, while some assemblers have separate associations
for different types of suppliers. This paper concentrates on the associations of parts suppliers
as they are numerically the most significant In general, association members take up a large
proportion -- around 80 or 90 per cent -- of each assembler's expenditure on purchasing parts.
However, the degree to which the association is encompassing varies slightly from assembler
to assembler. The most encompassing association was Kyohokai, whose 183 members, out of
a total of 350 parts suppliers, accounted for nearly all (98 per cent) of Toyota's total purchasing
expenditure on parts. In the same year, Nissan was also said to be trading with a total of 350
parts suppliers, of which the 191 association members accounted for 90 per cent of Nissan's
total purchasing expenditure (see Table 2).
* INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*
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Membership is Broader than Keiretsu
Suppliers' association members include both suppliers which are considered by the
assembler to be part of its keiretsu group and other suppliers which are not. Unlike vertically
integrated firms, vertical keiretsu groups (Gerlach 1992) have blurred boundaries to the extent
that the business community defines itself as a keiretsu group by virtue of having overlapping
and multiplex ties in shareholding, personnel and trading. But it is clear that whatever
definition is adopted, suppliers' association membership captures a broader segment of the
parts supplier industry than implied by the term keiretsu..
For instance, in the case of Toyota's Kyohokai association, members may be classified
broadly into three categories. First, there are 10 member companies which Toyota itself
defines as part of the so-called Toyota Group (for example, Nippondenso, Toyota Auto Body
and Aisin Seiki). The Group firms are linked through a complex reciprocal shareholding
pattern, with around a quarter of the Group firms' total shares being held within the Group.
Besides the 10 Group companies, there are 25 Kyohokai members whose largest shareholder
is Toyota Motors. Thus, around a fifth of the total 183 Kyohokai members are part of the core
vertical keiretsu group.
Second, there are around 40 locally based sub-contractors which tend to be independent
in shareholding and personnel aspects, but are heavily dependent on orders placed by Toyota
(Ueda 1989, p. 15-6). Their businesses are mainly in mechanical engineering such as metal
pressing, casting and forging. They have a long history of trading with Toyota, from which
they have received technical and managerial assistance. If unions are recognised at these firms,
they tend to belong to the All Toyota Federation of Enterprise Unions. These links, both
managerial and labour, may warrant grouping these firms as part of the Toyota keiretsu group.
But this leaves us with just over a half of Kyohokai members in the third category,
consisting of mainly medium-sized independent firms, such as Akebono Brake, which do not
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owe allegiance to any particular assembler for their origin and growth, and some large
corporations such as Toshiba and Dunlop Japan. These so-called independents constitute a
non-negligible proportion of the other assemblers' association membership. Some assemblers'
association members are easily categorizable into relatively dependent sub-contractors and
larger independent suppliers. For example, Nissan, before the 1991 reorganisation of its
association, had made the clearest distinction by having two separate organisations. Takarakai
with 104 members in 1990 was for smaller suppliers who tended to be heavily dependent on
Nissan's business, and Shohokai with 70 members was for larger independent suppliers.
Other assemblers' associations have been making this same distinction informally by having
regional branches within a single suppliers' association. For example, Toyota's Tokai
Kyohokai and Mazda's Western Japan (Hiroshima area) section of its Yokokai are for locally
based suppliers in the main.
Growing Overlap in Membership
Once it is established that suppliers' association membership emcompasses groupings
which are broader than keiretsu groupings, it is perhaps not surprising to discover significant
overlaps in membership. Even arch rivals, Toyota and Nissan, shared 44 suppliers in their
respective associations in 1985 (Ueda 1989, p. 1). Moreover, this is not just a recent
phenomenon, as 32 suppliers belonged to both Toyota's association and one of Nissan' s
associations as early as in 1967 (Miwa 1990). In 1992, there were 191 members of Nissan's
Nisshokai, of which 55 were also members of Toyota' s Kyohokai (the author's calculation
based on Auto Trade Journal and JAPIA 1992). These companies were predominantly
manufacturers of tires and rubber parts, glass, paint, batteries, electronic parts, bearings and
brake systems. By contrast, suppliers which have remained members of a single association
tended to be in mechanical engineering.
Over time, there has been a growth in multiple membership of suppliers' associations.
In particular, the number of parts suppliers which participated in five or more suppliers'
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association associations increased from 67 in 1980, to 81 in 1985 and 93 in 1990 (See Table
3). Of the 93 inrf990, 20 firms were members of eight major associations (i.e. Toyota,
Nissan, Mitsubishi, Mazda, Isuzu, Fuji, Daihatsu, Hino) and were also main suppliers to
Honda. These companies are producers of brake systems, bearings, springs, spark plugs,
tires, belting, and batteries. They tend to play a leading role in association activities, by taking
on chairmanship and executive positions in association committees and meetings. Thus,
instead of regarding the automotive industry as consisting of eleven overlapping keiretsu
groups each headed by an assembler, the industry may be better characterized as a network
with the 20 or so core primary suppliers transmitting information from one association to
another. Assemblers with a relatively new suppliers' association, such as Mitsubishi and
Mazda, have learnt the know-how in running the association from these core suppliers, rather
than from competitor assemblers.
* INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *
Why has multiple membership of suppliers' association increased over time? Possible
candidates for major causes of multiple membership are: (a) slower growth after the 1973 oil
crisis which led some suppliers to diversify their customer outlets, (b) the electronification of
the automotive technology which led assemblers to source from non-traditional sources (Ikeda
1989) and from sources possessing technological expertise which the assembler had little hope
of being able to match in the short run, and (c) the globalisation of the Japanese automotive
industry. Examples of the latter two factors abound, but do not fully account for the growth in
multiple membership. In 1989, Nissan started purchasing electric fuel pumps from
Nippondenso for use at Nissan Motor Manufacturing Co. in the USA (Nikkei Shinbun 4
September 1990). In 1990, Tachi-S, a Nissan affiliated seat manufacturer, obtained an order
for Toyota' s new compact car model (Nikkei Shinbun 15 January 1990). Similarly, Hitachi, a
Nissan supplier, started trading with Toyota (Nikkei Shinbun 9 Feburary 1993), while Zexel
whose major business has been with Nissan and Isuzu also started supplying Toyota. But
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neither Hitachi nor Zexel nor Tachi-S are members of Toyota' s Kyohokai. Nor is
Nippondenso ainember of Nissan' s Nisshokai. Trading embodying strategic technology is
evidently possible without an association membership.
Membership Growth and Turnover
The trend towards overlapping membership was accompanied by an increase in the total
number of members over time. As one might expect, such increases tended to be greater
among smaller manufacturers such as Hino, Fuji, and Mazda, than at larger firms, such as
Toyota, Nissan and Mitsubishi, which held a more or less constant membership during 1971-
1990.
Small changes in the total number of association members, of course, do not preclude
high turnover, with new entrants replacing those that exit. In fact, an impression that
suppliers' association membership is stable is more accurate for some assemblers than for
others (see Table 4). In the 1970s, Nissan's associations had the lowest turnover, but by
the 1980s, Toyota' s association emerged as the one with the lowest rates of quits and entry,
while membership has been quite unstable at Mitsubishi Motors and Fuji Heavy Industries. At
Toyota, the Tokai Kyohokai had 105 members in 1963. By 1971, there were 120 members;
only 5 of the old members had been dropped, while 20 were added (Smitka 1991, p.85).
During 1971-81, 21 new suppliers joined, while only 3 left; and during 1981-92, 8 joined
while 2 left the Tokai Kyohokai.
* INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE *
By contrast, at Mitsubishi Motors, 84 firms entered while 83 firms exited the
Kashiwakai during 1971-81, and 73 entered while 46 exited during 1981-90. Thus, on a
rough count, of the 358 members in 1990, only about a half remained members over the entire
twenty year period (see also Smitka 1991, p.85-7).
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What factors account for the differences in turnover rates among associations? One
reason appears to be differences in the assemblers' product strategy. In the Japanese
automobile industry, it is well known that the implicit supplier contract is for the duration of a
model cycle. This implies that the possible occasions for the assembler to switch suppliers,
and hence for potential entry and exit of association members, are more numerous the greater
the product variety and the shorter the model cycle. Given that the length of the model cycle is
more or less the same across assemblers, the greater variety of vehicles manufactured by
Mitsubishi Motors, as compared to Toyota, perhaps accounts in part for the higher turnover
rate in Mitsubishi' s Kashiwakai membership than in Toyota's.
Product or marketing strategy may affect the scope for continuous sourcing in another
way. In particular, a contrast may be drawn between two broad types of marketing. On the
one hand, some assemblers, such as Toyota, pursue full-line marketing with an emphasis on
the continuum in the spectrum of models from low to high price. On the other hand, other
assemblers, such as Honda and Nissan to an extent, pursue a segmented market strategy with
an emphasis on bringing out discrete 'hits' targetted at specific customer groups (Itami et al
1988 chapter 5). The former can take better advantage of common styling and parts over
model cycles as well as across existing models than the latter. Therefore, supplier relationships
can be expected to be more continuous at full-line strategy assemblers like Toyota than at
segmented strategy assemblers like Honda.
Another factor which may account for differential membership turnover rates is the
assemblers' timing of entry into the car industry. Early entrants, such as Isuzu, Toyota and
Nissan, needed to nurture their own supplier base. Late entrants like Honda could buy in parts
from suppliers nurtured by other assemblers. There is a presumption here that some of the
suppliers which received much technical assistance earlier started diversifying their customer
outlets without compromising on loyal trading with the older assemblers.
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2. Historical Origins and Contemporary Context
The suppliers' association (kyoryokukal) literally translates as a' cooperation
association'. It is generally a voluntary association with their own rules and regulations. Its
aim is generally said to be to enhance member suppliers' cooperation with the assembler and
with each other. Most of the assembler's associations have a name which signifies
cooperation, friendship, or prosperity. Some suppliers' associations, just like Japanese
companies, are described as a 'community of fate' (unmei kyodotai ). Tracing the historical
origins and the evolution of suppliers' association assists us in understanding these sentiments.
Historical Evolution
The oldest of the supplier associations is Toyota's Kyohokai which may be traced back
to a gathering in 1939 (Kyohokai 1967, p. 10), although a formal association was not launched
until 1943. As part of the wartime control regime, the Japanese government at the time
imposed a regulation for nominating small and medium sized firms to supply to large firms in
order to control industrial production for the war effort. Non-designated firms were left to
perish due to lack of funds and materials (Nakamura 1986, p.124-5). Kyohokai was founded
at the request of Toyota's suppliers (referred to as cooperating factories (kyoryoku kojo)) in
order to ensure that they could survive this period of hardship. A central task of the Kyohokai,
not surprisingly, was to channel raw materials and funds, which only Toyota Motors could
secure through the ration system, to member suppliers.
With the end of the Second World War, Kyohokai's central task shifted towards
making improvements in technological and managerial capabilities of member firms. The
original members, who formed the Tokai (region) Kyohokai in 1947, were joined by newly
formed Tokyo Kyohokai and Kansai Kyohokai members. The latter members tended to be
11
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larger specialist component suppliers, which developed independently of Toyota and were
considered more capable managerially. This new group of suppliers aroused eagerness among
the original members to strengthen their management system.
The first opportunity to make improvements collectively presented itself in1953, when
the prefectural authorities offered a free factory benchmarking service (kojo shindan) to
Kyohokai members (Kyohokai 1967, p.24; Wada 1991). This service was part of the post-
war government policy to rationalize and modernize small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs). Because of large numbers, the Japanese SME Agency chose the keiretsu group (and
the industrial district) as units of diagnosis, thus endorsing the existence of suppliers'
associations. The public consultancy offered concrete solutions to establishing managerial
objectives and production plans, and to improving productivity and quality at each of the
supplier firms. Kyoyokai members' effort in implementing the solutions bore fruit in the form
of the launch of Toyopet Crown in 1955.
Government policy also encouraged SMEs to form themselves into groups in a more
explicit manner, through the SME Cooperative Association Law (Chusho Kigyoto Kyodo
Kumiai Ho) of 1949. Cooperatives, once approved and registered publicly, can take out
investment loans from government financial institutions, and receive government subsidies for
a variety of activities, such as employee training and joint research in recent years. Around
47,000 formally registered cooperatives existed in Japan in 1991 (SMEA 1992, p. 106). They
are regionally based associations, and do not normally have a focus around a common
customer among their members. Cooperatives in the auto industry are exceptions to this
convention. The 1950s saw the formation of a number of cooperatives in the car industry, by
local suppliers to Mazda, Daihatsu, Hino, and Nissan Diesel. At these assemblers,
cooperatives continue to exist, with an overlapping membership with the suppliers' association
associations which were founded subsequently.
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A major cooperative association in the car industry which is in effect a suppliers'
association association at the same time is the Suzuki Motors Cooperative Association. It was
founded in 1957 when the Shizuoka prefectural office approached Suzuki Motors with details
of recently enacted laws concerning SMEs. Suzuki cashed in on the financial facilities offered
by these laws to create its suppliers' association in the form of a cooperative. The Cooperative
Law requires that the cooperative membership be restricted to SMEs. But except for this
requirement, the reasoning behind setting up the Suzuki Cooperative was rather similar to that
for founding suppliers' association associations in general. A document "The Intent to
Establish the Suzuki Cooperative Association' states:
"With a rapid progress in society, every company is facing increasingly tough
competition over improvements in product performance and the expansion of
production. Our cooperating factories must adapt to both the economic and
technological aspects of this situation. As one measure, a policy shall be hereby
implemented, which will promote the welfare of every cooperating factory
through friendship and mutual help. We intend to promote a higher level of
cooperation, and to achieve co-prosperity with Suzuki Motor Company as our
parent factory."
Around the same time in 1958, Nissan's plant level supplier associations at the
Yokohama and Yoshiwara factories, founded a few years earlier, were consolidated into
Takarakai. Takarakai was essentially a gathering of small and medium sized firms, whose
technological and managerial capabilties Nissan deemed necessary to strengthen. The
concerted effort to improve industrial engineering and to adopt quality control methods
culminated in Nissan's receipt of the Deming Award, the very first in the Japanese auto
industry, in June 1960. This spurred Toyota suppliers to do better. From 1961, Toyota
Motors started to take a greater lead in Kyohokai activities, centred around the diffusion of
Total Quality Control and Value Engineering to the top management of core suppliers (Wada
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1984, p.88). Domestic rivalry was thus a significant factor in intensifying the effort poured on
association activities.
However, the 1960s presented an added challenge, namely the liberalisation of
international trade and capital markets. In anticipation of open trade, Japanese assemblers made
a concerted effort to improve quality and cost efficiency. There was widespread fear that if
nothing was done, dismantling the protection would severely undermine the domestic
automotive industry. Some suppliers' association associations, such as Nissan's Shohokai
and Isuzu Kyowakai, were formed specifically to meet this challenge of internationalisation.
To summarize, suppliers' associations spread in the Japanese car industry in three
waves. The first was the years leading up to the Second World War, when the assembler and
suppliers attempted to forge organisational solidarity to cope with the war effort; materials
shortages posed a problem to be overcome. The second wave was in the 1950s, when
cooperatives as well as suppliers' associations were formed; cooperatives were the channel for
interest-reduced equipment modernisation loans to members, as well as for financial help in
setting up common services for members. The third wave in the 1960s was associated with the
prospect of the liberalisation of capital markets and international trade, and the perceived need
to make a leap in international competitiveness. The associations in the post-war period were
mainly private sector initiatives, but favourable government policies towards SMEs also
facilitated them.
Suppliers' Association Activities in the 1990z
Today, every association has its own rules and regulations which spell out the
bureaucratic machinery that supports the association activities. In the case of Toyota' s Tokai
Kyohokai, an Administrative Board (kanjikai), which meets every two months, is in charge of
deciding the basic policy of the association, and of drafting a plan of activities for the
forthcoming year. Such a plan is approved at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), which is
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attended by top managers of all member companies. They listen intently to the keynote speech
delivered by Toyota's chief executive for clues on Toyota's strategic thinking and future
direction. At least a dozen more Toyota managers also attend this AGM. After an award
ceremony for best quality or VA.VE suggestions for member suppliers, the day closes with a
dinner party. More detailed information on Toyota's purchasing policy, production schedules
and sales trends is communicated to member suppliers via the Discussion Meetings
(kondankai) (which meets 8 times a year) and an occasional lecture or two by Toyota
managers.
The activity plan is implemented by sectoral groups and functional committees. Most
of the assembler's associations have this dual structure, although the number of groups and
committees vary from association to association. Tokai Kyohokai has three sectors grouped
according to the type of parts that members produce. Each group meets once a month,
typically to visit a member supplier' s factory, and to learn from the member' s presentation
about problems and achievements at his company the following month. Tokai Kyohokai has
three functional committees, on quality, cost, and health and safety. Each meets at least once
every two months to study ways of improving the performance of member companies. The
committees may conduct a questionnaire survey of members, and write reports and manuals on
best practice examples based on members' own experience. The cost committee also organises
VE seminars, and the health and safety committee runs technical and safety courses for
employees of member companies. Lastly, there are a monthly newsletter, and baseball and
golf tournaments for members.
The above organisation structure is well suited to dealing with the staple diet issues of
quality, cost, and health and safety. In fact, although slightly different emphases may be put
on various aspects of an issue, the themes typically chosen by the suppliers' associations tend
to be focused around improving member companies' shopfloor efficiency. This bias is partly
because both assemblers and suppliers have felt thus far that gains can be made most by
15
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concentrating their efforts on incremental process innovation rather than product innovation.
This was dictated by the timing of the Japanese assemblers' entry into the auto industry (Wada
1984, p.97). Another reason for why association activities remain focused around process
technology is the need to find themes which are of wide and common interest to the members.
Recently, some suppliers' associations, including at Toyota and Daihatsu, held meetings to
discuss how to reduce parts variety. Suppliers may make good suggestions. But the spirit of
open and frank information exchange may be undermined if there is too much shift towards
design and development issues which touch on confidentiality in bilateral trading.
What's in it for Assemblers? A Trade-off between Control and Autonomy
The historical overview above noted why suppliers' association associations were
started. Do the same reasons for their founding explain why they persist? What are the
incentives of assemblers to continue sponsoring their association? Are there disadvantages, as
well as advantages, of having an association from the assembler' s viewpoint? Answers to
these questions differ again from company to company within the Japanese car industry.
At one extreme, Honda, as mentioned earlier, does not have any association even
today. One possible explanation for the absence is that Honda's late entry into the four wheel
business made it possible to free ride on other manufacturers' effort at improving their
suppliers. However, late entry does not appear to be a sufficient explanation for the absence of
an association, as some assemblers have established their own associations subsequently,
Mazda being the most recent case in 1981.
Honda continues not to have its suppliers' association because of a different perspective
backed up by its purchasing philosophy which puts much emphasis on competition and
equality of trading. To Honda, suppliers' association seems too old fashioned and imbued
with an undesirable image of top-down control of suppliers. According to a Honda purchasing
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manager, an association is not necessary as long as there is close bilateral exchange of
information (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun 11 June 1991). Besides, it has been argued by Honda
managers that since suppliers' association is largely an association for suppliers, Honda cannot
initiate something which suppliers thus far have not demanded.
The other assemblers which have an association continue to retain much control over
the activities of the association. For instance, first, the association is typically financed mostly
by membership subscription, but is not fully autonomous as the assembler provides a small
subsidy out of the purchasing department's budget. Second, the association's secretariat office
may exist in a separate building from the assembler's purchasing department as at Toyota, but
the secretary-general (jimu kyokucho) is typically a retiree from the assembler. Third, although
less common today, many of the associations required the assembler's recommendation, as
well as the approval of, the association's Administrative Board, for members to enter and exit
the association.
But there are also some moves towards giving more autonomy to suppliers'
associations. Association activities remain focused around the assembler whose presence is
felt at all the association meetings; no formal meeting takes place without the presence of at
least one representative from the assembler. For example, although the purchasing department
remains the point of contact for the suppliers' association, functional committee meetings are
attended by the assembler' s personnel in the relevant functional department (e.g. the quality
committee attended by the assembler's quality control manager). Precisely what the role these
managers play has a different nuance from assembler to assembler. Mazda and Nissan, both
with recent reorganisations in their suppliers' association, define their managers' role at these
meetings as coordinators, who may steer discussions and be instrumental in setting themes.
Ultimately, the chosen themes and activities must be useful to the assembler. By contrast, the
Purchasing Department of Toyota conveyed their wish to withdraw into a supporting and
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advisory role, as member suppliers are considered more capable of taking greater initiatives
now than in the-past.
But whether leading or advisory, providing support for the suppliers' association is
expensive in managerial time, judging from the frequency of meetings. Weighed against this
cost are the benefits which were most frequently cited by respondents at company visits by the
author, (a) of being able to communicate about production plans en masse, and (b) of soliciting
good suggestions for common problems, such as common parts and the environment. The
lateral communication and mutual learning among suppliers through association activities were
also considered to have benefits which outweighed the potential danger of cartelisation or
bargaining by groups of suppliers.
3. Assessing the Role of Suppliers' Associations: Survey Evidence
Having examined the historical and contemporary functions of suppliers' association
from the assembler's viewpoint, this section turns to the analysis of the reasons why Japanese
suppliers participate in association activities. In particular, the key questions are:-
(i) What do suppliers regard as the most important benefits of belonging to a suppliers'
association? In particular, how important is lateral inter-supplier learning as compared to
bilateral assembler-supplier linkages?
(ii) How do the benefits of belonging to suppliers' association vary according to the assembler
and supplier characteristics?
(iii) What are the performance outcomes of association membership?
The rest of this paper reports on suppliers' views about the above according to the results of a
large-scale survey.
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Survey Data Description
In July 1993, the author conducted a survey of around 1500 automotive parts suppliers
in Japan, sponsored by MIT's International Motor Vehicle Program. The sample was drawn
from a comprehensive list of all first-tier suppliers of components for cars and trucks in Japan
(Auto Trade Journal and JAPIA 1993). Surveys were sent to sales and marketing directors,
who were asked to answer the survey for a typical product provided to their most important
customer. 473 usable responses were received, constituting a 30 per cent response rate.
As shown in Table 5, 83.9 per cent of the survey respondents are members of the
association of the customer for which the survey was answered. Since the survey did not ask
about multiple membership, 'non-members' may be members of other customers' association.
But to the extent that respondents were asked to answer the survey for their most important
customer, the member/ non-member distinction should capture a major difference among first-
tier suppliers. Among the non-member respondents, 44% were suppliers to Honda, 27% were
suppliers to Toyota and the rest suppliers to other assemblers.
* INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE *
In this sample, members were not significantly more likely than non-members to be
owned by a car assembler. Nor was the number of customers per supplier significantly
different between members and non-members. Moreover, the number of other firms supplying
the same part to the same customer was actually greater -- 2.3 companies -- for members than
for non-members -- 1.8 companies.
The most significant difference between members and non-members lay in the record of
long-term trading with their customer to date: over 50% of the members have traded with the
customer for 20 years or longer, as compared to 38% for non-members. Moreover, members'
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perception of commitment by the customer into the future was much more long-term than non-
members'. This tallies with the earlier evidence in Section 1 that the membership turnover of
suppliers' associations is generally quite low.
Benefits of membership
The majority of the survey respondents are association members. But there is evidence
of a significant variation in the incentives for belonging to a suppliers' association The
questionnaire asked respondents to rank the five most important benefits of belonging to an
association. The options given were the five listed in Table 6, derived from semi-structured
interviews with both assemblers and suppliers and the pilot testing of the survey.
*INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE *
Dealing with overall averages first, the most popular benefit of belonging to an
association was better informational access to the customer. Next, 'learning from other
members through exchange of technical information' -- lateral inter-supplier learning -- was
considered the second most important benefit, and more important than the receipt of technical
assistance from the customer. Many members apparently regard fellow member suppliers as a
more important source of technical know-how than their customer. This lends support to what
Fruin and Nishiguchi (1993) call a'network model' or a'learning model', in contrast to the
bilateral or dualistic model. These top three reasons were followed by the benefit of receiving
stable orders from the customer, and the benefit of being able to monitor the customer' s
behaviour. The rank ordering of these five reasons remain the same for various sub-samples
considered below, but the following distinctions may be noted.
Suppliers were asked in the survey about the process of product development. Those
suppliers who jointly developed with their customer or took entire responsibility for design
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tended to value the first reason -- access to information about the customer -- more than
suppliers whose products were developed by their customer. Thus, the type of customer
information which is valued by members appears to be about design and development for the
next model, rather than, for instance, about the certainty of production scheduling.
Suppliers were also asked to assess their own technological capability. Those which
considered their product design engineering capability to be above average valued access to
customer information through the association more than those with average or below average
capability. By contrast, the second most popular reason -- mutual inter-supplier learning --
was cited less by the above average respondents than by those with average or below average
design capability. Moreover, the opportunity to receive technical assistance from the customer
-- the third benefit -- was less of a concern for suppliers developed their products jointly with
their customer or on their own.
These findings might lead one to expect that suppliers' associations continue to be of
greater utility for members with below average technical capability than for those with superior
skills. However, that is not the case. In fact, suppliers with superior design capability
disagreed more with both the statements, 'Benefits of association activities have declined
recently' and'Association is no longer central in our dealings with this customer', than
suppliers with average or inferior skills. This might be because technically superior suppliers
are engaged in informal know-how trading among themselves (von Hippel 1987), while
suppliers who have little to offer to others in terms of technical know-how are not getting less
useful information from other suppliers.
Table 6 shows a clear distinction in the magnitude of benefits between members who
feel that the suppliers' association is of declining use and those who do not. As compared to
those who saw no decline in the usefulness of suppliers' association, the suppliers which
agreed with the statement "Benefits of association activities have declined recently" value both
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technical assistance and inter-supplier learning less, fear leakage of know-how to other
members more,and value the receipt of stable orders from the customer more. Moreover, the
function of the suppliers' association as a forum for monitoring whether their customer
behaves and acts fairly was more highly rated by suppliers experiencing a decline in the
usefulness of the association.
Lastly, the magnitude of benefits differed according to which assembler' s association
the respondents belonged to. As shown in Table 6, members of the Toyota association tended
to regard the association as still central in their dealings with Toyota, not least because Toyota
members perceived greater benefits in technical assistance from the customer than members of
other assemblers' associations. It bears out the impression that Toyota' s association, with its
long-standing history and its concerted effort to diffuse the Toyota Production System, is
different both in the magnitude of benefits it brings to its members and the function it fulfills.
Performance outcomes of association membership
The paper began by posing three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) points of view
concerning the function of the suppliers' association. The first was an economic theory focus
on bilateral contracts which renders supplier associations irrelevant (the Bilateral Contracting
Case). A second view was that associations had been useful for improving supplier efficiency
in the past but not any longer today (the Declining Utility Case). A third perspective regarded
suppliers' association as like an exclusionary keiretsu or a cartel (the Cartel Case).
We would expect the relative economic performance of association members and non-
members to be different in each of the three perspectives. In the Declining Utility Case, we
would expect members to be no different from, or even performing worse than, non-members.
In the Cartel Case, we would expect members to be reaping monopoly profit, and possibly
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better performing in other respects, as compared to non-members. The Bilateral Contracting
Case remains silent on this issue.
As shown in Table 7, the overall picture of the link between membership and
performance is mixed. First, pre-tax profitability was lower for members than for non-
members. This profitability result refutes a claim that supplier associations might be acting like
a cartel reaping monopoly profit. Second, members saw a faster growth of sales to the
customer than non-members. Third, R&D as a percent of sales was lower for members than
for non-members. This may be because there are' network externalities' among members who
can achieve high sales growth without R&D spending. This may also indicate that there is a
group of suppliers who do not wish to belong to an association as they would do better by
appropriating benefits from intense R&D without fear of leakage to competitors. Fourth,
members were not significantly better at achieving cost reduction nor in reducing production
and delivery batch sizes, according to the survey data.
* INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE *
Does performance vary with different incentives for belonging to an association? The
only significant distinction was between members which agreed and those which disagreed
with the statement that benefits of the association declined recently. Those perceiving a decline
in the usefulness of the association experienced slower growth in both sales to the customer
and market share, while their costs rose more on average during 1988-92.
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4. Conclusions
This paper presented an analysis of the structure and the functions of suppliers'
associations in the Japanese car industry. The underlying set of questions in the paper were:
i. why did the suppliers' association associations start;
ii. why do they persist; and
iii what are their effects?
The major empirical contribution of the research reported here is in its reliance on the
result of a large scale survey of nearly 500 parts suppliers to all the eleven Japanese
assemblers. This data has enabled the analysis of not only the structure of the association, but
of the suppliers' perspectives on the role of these associations. The diversity in their function
from association to association is borne out by survey evidence which complements the case
studies carried out on Toyota (Wada 1984) and on Mitsubishi (Smitka 1991).
One of the important findings of this study with an implication for theory is that lateral
communication and learning between suppliers in the same association is just as valued by
members as technical assistance from the assembler. This finding calls for some modification
to the analytical framework which has recently become focused on bilateral contracting between
the assembler and the supplier.
The survey provided evidence that the suppliers' association associations continue to
exist in Japan not merely out of inertia but because it is serving a useful function in delivering
benefits to both the assembler and member suppliers. Those suppliers who found the
association of declining utility were not in the majority, and were less likely among members of
Toyota' s Kyohokai than among members of other assemblers' associations. Moreover, those
members who find it of declining importance or utility tended to be worse in their performance
than other members.
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The analysis in the paper indicates that on the whole, the suppliers' association
association contributes towards increasing the informational efficiency of the industry-wide
network, in which the core nodes are increasingly not the assemblers, but the twenty or so
major component suppliers which serve several assemblers at once. The suppliers associations
with overlapping membership have provided a strong mechanism for the rapid diffusion of
innovations within the Japanese automotive sector (e.g. Lieberman 1994 for the more rapid
diffusion of JIT in Japan than in the USA). This network for technology diffusion appears to
be as important as the close bilateral assembler-supplier relationship in accounting for the
overall performance of the Japanese automotive industry.
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Table 1: Membership of Suppliers' Associations 1990
N.B. * Some multi-plant supplier companies may belong to more than one of the
regionally based associations of an assembler. The numbers shown in this table
include such double-counting.
'* Honda does not have any association. The suppliers refer to those listed as 'main
suppliers' in the first source.
Sources: Auto Trade Journal and JAPIA (1990)
Japan Motor Manufacturers Association
Nihon no Jidosha Buhin Kogyo;
(1991 ) Nihon noJidosha Kogyo
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Auto Makers' Founding Total Vehicle Ratio
Association Year Members Production (B) / (A)
.............. (A) (units) (B)
Toyota 229* 4,085,081 17,839
Tokai Kyohokai 1939/43 141
Kanto Kyohokai 1947 63
Kansai Kyohokai 1947 25 
Nissan 174* 2,330,943 13,396
Takarakai 1954 104
Shohokai 1966 70
Mitsubishi 262 1,405,647 3,883
Kashiwakai 1971
Mazda Yokokai 1981 180* 1,385,941 7,700
West Japan 62
Kanto 62
Kansai 56
Isuzu 1962 284 470,950 1,658
Kowakai 
Fuji Heavy Industries 1986 218 528,333 2,424
Subaru Yuhikai
Daihatsu 1969 168 670,481 3,991
Kyoyukai 
__
Suzuki Motors 1957 97 858,268 3,693
Cooperative
Hino 1962 238 90,269 379
Suppliers' association
Nissan Diesel 1960 57 60,529 1,062
Yayoikai
Honda* * n.a. 297 1,358,415 4,574
,~~ ,, i _ ii . ................ . ii
---- ·- _..... i. ;
Table 2: Members
Suppliers 1 992
N.B. Pparts suppliers;
suppliers.
of Suppliers' Associations as a Proportion of Total
M-materials suppliers; E-equipment (including tool and jig)
Source: Company visits and interviews by the author in 1992 and 1993.
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Auto Makers Association Total Number of % of Total Parts
Members Parts Suppliers Purchasing Cost
P M E taken up by
Members
Toyota 183 0 65 350 98%
Nissan 191 0 0 350 90%
Mitsubishi 376 0 0 600 85%
Mazda 198 0 0 350 86%
Isuzu 217 41 40 427 90-95%
Fuji 168 0 0 246 96%
Daihatsu 175 68 17 260 90%
Suzuki 104 0 0 186 31%
Hino 190 0 57 500 80%
Nissan Diesel 147 0 0 300 85%
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Niles Parts _.
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' :. 
.i. Nishikawa Rub.
Nisshin Kogyo
Nittan Valve
Nippon St. Glas
Nippon Air Br.
Nippon Cable S
Nippon Seiko
Dunlo Jaan _ 
Nippondenso
Jap. Stor. Batt. _
Nihon Power S.
NHK Spring
Nip. Piston R.
Nihon Michelin
Bando Chem.
Hayashi Telem .
NGK Sark Pl.
Hitachi Kasei
Hitachi Kinz.
Hitachi Seisaku
Bridgestone
Nachi-Fuikoshi 
Fui Bellws
Fuli Valve
Furukawa Elec.
Furukawa Batt.
Marui Industrial
Matsushita El.
Maruko Keiho. 
Mitsui Kinzoku
Mltsuba Electr. 
Mitsubishi Ste.
Mitsuboshi Bel.
Muro C_
Murata Sprin.
Meiwa Indus
Yazaki Corp.
Yuasa Battery
Yokahama Rub.
Riken Corp. ._ 
.... _ - 18975 1 - 1980 - 19 85 - 1990
IN.B. Shades indicate membership in that year. I I I I I I I I I I I I
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Table 4: Entrants and Leavers of Suppliers' Associations 1971-90
SUPPUERS' ASSOCIATION 1971/2 - 1980/1 1981/2-1989/90
Entrants Leavers Entrants Leavers
Toyota Total 47 39 20 13
Turnover* 2.1 1.7 1.0 0.6
Nissan Total 16 14 30 15
Turnover 1.0 0.9 2.0 1.0
Mitsubishi Total 84 83 73 46
Turnover 2.5 2.5 3.3 2.1
Mazda Total 44 59 22 17
Turnover 3.4 4.5 1.4 1.1
Isuzu Total 96 33 49 44
Turnover 3.9 1.3 1.9 1 .7
Fuji Total 95 43 80 76
Turnover 5.1 2.3 4.1 3.9
Daihatsu Total 33 50 32 7
Turnover 2.2 3.4 2.3 0.5
Suzuki Total 42 18 19 24
Turnover 4.6 2.0 2.1 3.0
Hino Total 132 43 21 27
Turnover 6.5 2.1 1.0 1.3
Nissan Total 12 17 5 7
Diesel Turnover 2.0 2.8 1.0 1.4
Honda Total mna. n.a. 195 239
Turnover 6.7 8.2
i ii i i i i i i i .iil I Ii mlli IiI 
N.B. Thanks to Toshiko wase and Arisa Ouchi for assistance in compiling this table.
* Average turnover rate per annum - Avera number of trants or leavers per annum
(Members in initial year + Members in end year)/2
Source: Author's own calculations based on the data in Auto Trade Joumrnal and JAPIA Nihon
no Jidosha Buhin Kogyo, various years.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Association Members in the Survey (N=473)
Difference between members and non-members is significant according to the t-test at:-
* 10% level
** 5% level
*** 1% level
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Members IIINon-members
TOTALSAMPR..E 83.9% 16.1%
OWNERSHIP
% of suppliers who are wholly or partially
owned by the assembler 34.5% 29.3%
EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY
Number of customers per suppliers 4.1 3.8
Number of other firms supplying the same 2.3 1.8
product to the same customer *
LENGTH OF TRADING
Number of years of trading to date (% of 55.9% 38.4%
suppliers with 20 years or longer) ***
Customer commitment in future (in years) ** 27 years 16 years
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Table 7: Performance Outcomes of Association Membership: Survey Evidence
N.B. Percentage point change measures the difference between one rate and another rate. For
example, the change from a 4% margin to a 6% margin is 2 percentage points.
Difference between members and non-members is significant according to the t-test at:-
* 10% level
** 5% level
*** 1% level
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Members Non-members
Pr-tax profits as sales *** 2.6% 3.5%
R&D as % of sales *** 1.7% 2.6%
PercentIof sales in new products since 4 years ago 1 15%
% change in sales to the customer 1988 1992 * .8 4.1%
Percentage point (pp) change in the Japanese 0.pp 1. pp
market share 198&1992
Illl I_ l l[ l ~ l I H ) I ,,tl ..
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ENDNOTES
1. As of September 1992, 18 members of Mitsubishi's Kashiwakai were non-Japanese,
including Bosch, GM Japan Allison, and Simpson Industries (Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun 11
September 1992). Nissan's Nisshokai had 9 non-Japanese members, including Goodyear Tire
and Rubber (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun 4 August 1992).
2. Of the 130 or so North American parts and materials suppliers of Toyota Motor
Manufacturing in Kentucky, sixteent suppliers formed a suppliers' association called BAMA in
1991 (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun 19 August 1991) (see Hines 1994 pp.241-247) for subsequent
developments). Also, GAMA was formed in 1993 by nine suppliers to NUMMI in California.
3. Hines (1992, 1994) reports the case of Llanelli Radiators Supplier Association which
was established with the advice of the Welsh Development Agency (WDA). WDA was also an
initiator of a group of Welsh-based suppliers to Toyota Motor UK and another group
supplying to Rover. Such public sector consultancy and support were indispensable in Japan
also, at the time when supplier associations were still in their nascent stage in the 1950s (see
Section 2 of this paper). Also, Andersen Consulting (1993) recommends that the top
management of European companies 'build shared destiny relationships with your suppliers -
through establishing supplier clubs' (p.5). See also Lamming (1993).
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